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Non-technical Summary 
Business start-ups and young enterprises introduce new products to the market and employ new processes 
for production. In order to create these new products and processes, firms often engage in R&D. Since 
conducting R&D is an expensive task, substantial financial resources are required. However, the internal 
financing capacity of young firms is limited because young firms generate no or a very low sales volume in 
the first years succeeding market entry, and no revenue reserves from previous years are available. In the 
case of limited internal financing, loans can relieve financing constraints on R&D activities. The relation-
ship between R&D activities and loan financing can also be argued to go in the opposite direction. The 
ability of young enterprises to tap external financing sources depends, among other things, on growth 
opportunities which may be generated by R&D activities. Moreover, R&D expenditures are rather allocated 
into intangible assets that cannot serve as collaterals. This reduces a firm’s possibility of loan financing. 
In this paper, we explore empirically the bidirectional relationship between R&D and loan financing. We 
use data from the first two waves of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, a unique survey data set of young firms 
in Germany founded in the period from 2005 to 2008. Descriptive results show that 20% of young firms use 
loan financing, whereas 13% of firms conduct own R&D activities. Moreover, in descriptive, bivariate 
comparison firms without R&D expenditures use a higher share of loan financing in total financing than 
firms conducting R&D. 
In a first step, we estimate single-equation models that explain, first, the share of loan financing and, 
second, firms’ R&D intensity, defined as R&D expenditures over total sales. Our estimates reveal that the 
share of loan financing is basically determined by firm-specific variables derived from traditional theories 
of corporate finance like static trade-off theory or pecking order theory. Entrepreneur-specific variables 
only play a subordinate role for explaining the capital structure. On the contrary, both firm-specific and 
entrepreneur-specific variables are decisive for the level of firms’ R&D intensity. In the single-equation 
models, we find neither an effect of R&D intensity on the share of loan financing, nor an effect in the 
opposite direction. 
In a second step, we estimate a simultaneous, two-equation model in order to account for the interdepend-
ence of R&D activity and loan financing. Our results show that the coefficient estimates for the exogenous 
covariates hardly differ between the single-equation models and the simultaneous, two-equation model. 
However, the two-equation model proves that there is in fact a significantly positive, interdependent rela-
tionship between the share of loan financing and R&D intensity. Yet unobserved random shocks are nega-
tively correlated across the two equations. In response to a negative random shock, for example, firms 
decrease their leverage and simultaneously reduce their R&D activities. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Gründungen und junge Unternehmen führen neue Produkte in den Markt ein und etablieren neue Herstel-
lungsprozesse. Um Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen zu entwickeln, führen Unternehmen häufig For-
schungs- und Entwicklungsaktivitäten (FuE) durch, zu deren Finanzierung sie umfangreiche Finanzmittel 
benötigen. Die Innenfinanzierungskraft junger Unternehmen ist aufgrund geringer Umsätze und nicht 
vorhandener Gewinnrücklagen aus früheren Jahren allerdings beschränkt Bei eingeschränkten Möglichkei-
ten zur Innenfinanzierung können Kredite Restriktionen bei der Finanzierung von FuE-Aktivitäten abbauen. 
Doch auch ein umgekehrter Einfluss von FuE auf die Kreditfinanzierung lässt sich begründen: Die Fähig-
keit junger Unternehmen, an externe Finanzierungsquellen zu gelangen, hängt u.a. von der Aussicht auf 
zukünftiges Wachstum ab, die durch FuE geschaffen werden kann. Andererseits fließen FuE-Ausgaben 
überwiegend in immaterielle Vermögenswerte, die i.d.R. nicht als Ausfallsicherheiten dienen können, was 
die Möglichkeiten zur Kreditfinanzierung einschränkt. 
Im vorliegenden Papier wird der interdependente Zusammenhang zwischen FuE und Kreditfinanzierung 
empirisch untersucht. Dabei verwenden wir Daten der ersten beiden Befragungswellen des KfW/ZEW-
Gründungspanels, eines einmaligen Datensatzes zu jungen Unternehmen in Deutschland, die im Zeitraum 
von 2005 bis 2008 gegründet wurden. Deskriptive Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 20% der jungen Unternehmen 
Kreditfinanzierung nutzen, während 13% der Unternehmen eigene FuE-Aktivitäten betreiben. Im deskripti-
ven, bivariaten Vergleich weisen darüber hinaus Unternehmen ohne FuE-Ausgaben einen höheren Anteil 
der Kreditfinanzierung an der Gesamtfinanzierung auf als FuE-treibende Unternehmen. 
In einem ersten Schritt schätzen wir Eingleichungsmodelle, die zum einen den Kreditfinanzierungsanteil 
und zum anderen die FuE-Intensität, definiert als Verhältnis der FuE-Ausgaben zum Umsatz, erklären. Der 
Kreditfinanzierungsanteil wird im Wesentlichen bestimmt von unternehmensspezifischen Größen, wie sie 
aus traditionellen Theorien der Unternehmensfinanzierung abgeleitet werden (Trade-off-Theorie, Pecking-
Order-Theorie). Charakteristika der Gründer spielen nur eine geringe Rolle bei der Erklärung der Kapital-
struktur. Die FuE-Intensität wird hingegen sowohl von Unternehmensspezifika als auch von Eigenschaften 
der Gründerpersonen bestimmt. In den Eingleichungsmodellen zeigt sich weder ein Einfluss der FuE-
Intensität auf den Kreditfinanzierungsanteil, noch ist ein Effekt in die umgekehrte Richtung festzustellen. 
Um die Interdependenz zwischen FuE und Kreditfinanzierung zu berücksichtigen, schätzen wir in einem 
zweiten Schritt ein simultanes Gleichungsmodel. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich die Koeffizienten der 
exogenen Variablen zwischen den Eingleichungsmodellen und dem Zweigleichungsmodell kaum unter-
scheiden. Allerdings belegt das simultane Gleichungsmodell, dass ein signifikant positiver, interdependen-
ter Zusammenhang zwischen dem Kreditfinanzierungsanteil und der FuE-Intensität besteht. Im Zweiglei-
chungsmodell sind unbeobachtbare, zufällige Schocks negativ zwischen den Gleichungen korreliert. Als 
Reaktion auf einen negativen Schock senken Unternehmen beispielsweise ihren Kreditfinanzierungsanteil 
und reduzieren gleichzeitig ihre FuE-Aktivitäten. 
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1 Introduction 
Business start-ups and young enterprises introduce new products to the market and employ 
new processes for production. Engaging in research and development (R&D) is one route to 
create these new products and processes. Yet young firms’ capacity for internal financing of 
R&D is most likely more limited than the internal financing capacity of mature enterprises. 
Using debt financing can relieve internal financing constraints on R&D activity. However, the 
ability of young enterprises to tap external financing sources depends on their market pro-
spects, growth opportunities, and means of collateral—which are in turn determined by R&D 
activity (e.g., Chang et al., 2009). Therefore, R&D behaviour and decisions of young firms 
about debt financing should be considered interdependent.  
Existing evidence in the literature regarding the interdependence of R&D activity and debt 
financing is rather limited. In an early contribution, Hutchinson (1995) elaborates on the idea 
that financing and investment strategies of owner-managers are interdependent because own-
ers want to maintain control over their firms. Savignac (2008) estimates the influence of fi-
nancial constraints on innovation while accounting for the possibility that the occurrence of 
financial constraints depends on the ex ante capital structure and economic performance of a 
firm. Baldwin et al. (2002), drawing on a sample of established Canadian firms, also conclude 
that the relation between capital structure and R&D is bidirectional. In an analysis of start-ups 
in the US, Winston Smith (2010) investigates the role of bank loans for new firms’ financing 
and their subsequent innovation behaviour. She finds that a high leverage is associated with a 
decreasing number of new patents or new copyrights.  
All in all, approaches in the innovation literature and the literature on capital structure deci-
sions remain separated. Empirical investigations either test the influence of internal financing 
sources like cash flow on innovation activity (Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2010) or analyses 
are concerned with explaining the extent of leverage of a firm by taking into account innova-
tion behaviour as a proxy for growth opportunities (Chang et al., 2009; Achleitner et al., 
2011). In addition, existing empirical studies mostly focus on mature firms that have access to 
public equity and debt markets. Starts-ups and young enterprises are less often investigated in 
their own right, with the exception of venture capital financing of young high-tech firms. Our 
investigation is situated at the intersection of the different strands of literature and deals with 
the interdependence between R&D and debt financing of young firms.  
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Our empirical contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we scrutinise financing struc-
tures of young firms, both with R&D activities and without. Second, we explain the influence 
of debt finance on R&D expenditure of young firms. Third, and most importantly, we explic-
itly allow for an interaction of debt financing and R&D behaviour of young firms.  
Our analysis uses firm-level data of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, a unique survey data set of 
newly founded firms in Germany. High-tech firms are notably overrepresented in the sample 
of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. This feature enables us to investigate the relationship be-
tween financing decisions and R&D activities in detail, based on a large number of innovative 
and technology-intensive start-ups. Our estimation results show that firm-related characteris-
tics are more important than personal characteristics of the founders for explaining young 
firms’ loan share. On the other hand, human capital of employees and founders themselves 
heavily influence R&D intensity. Applying a bivariate Tobit model, we find that the interac-
tion between the share of loan financing and R&D intensity is positive. A higher share of loan 
financing allows for more R&D in young firms and at the same time a higher R&D intensity 
allows for a higher debt share. This relationship cannot be detected by merely estimating sin-
gle-equation models for R&D intensity and the share of loan financing because there is a neg-
ative correlation of unobserved shocks to both variables of interest. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give an overview of related studies 
in the literature. The empirical analysis starts with a description of our data set and descriptive 
analyses of financing structures and R&D activities of young firms in section 3. Estimation 
results for both single-equation approaches and a bivariate Tobit model are discussed in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Overview of Related Literature  
2.1 R&D Expenditure and Firms’ Capital Structure 
Financing of innovation is a recurrent theme in the economic debate. Empirical studies rely on 
R&D expenditure as a proxy for innovation input. First, R&D expenditure is often found to be 
positively linked to innovation output (e.g., van der Panne et al., 2003; Mairesse and Mohnen, 
2010, and the literature cited therein). Second, R&D expenditure has some interesting proper-
ties with regard to financing (Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2010). It covers investments in 
tangible assets like laboratory equipment as well as intangible assets such as human capital of 
research personnel. In the latter case, R&D expenditure does not result in collateral usable for 
debt financing. In addition, R&D expenditure has to be financed immediately while innova-
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tion output is uncertain and cash-flow resulting from innovation projects is realised in future 
periods only, sometimes with a considerable time lag. 
Several studies pay special attention to restrictions of innovation activity. It is stressed that 
internal resources and in particular cash flow are the main sources for innovation financing 
(e.g., Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011; Savignac, 2008; Czarnitzki, 2006; Bond et al., 2005; 
Hottenrott and Peters, 2011; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Yet outside finance plays a role as well. On the one hand, limita-
tion of external financing may hamper innovation activity (Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 
2010; Czarnitzki, 2006). On the other hand, debt financing disciplines borrowers by reducing 
free cash flow, increases the threat of bankruptcy and initiates monitoring activities of lenders 
that can influence innovation activity negatively (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009). In addition, 
financing innovation through external capital is difficult because innovation generates posi-
tive externalities and asymmetric information and tax issues arise if innovators and suppliers 
of financial capital are not identical (Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2010). These factors drive a 
wedge between internal and external costs of capital and can lead to underinvestment in R&D. 
As a consequence, not only the availability of financing, but also the composition of the fi-
nancing mix can influence R&D activity. 
Besides the availability and composition of external financing, firm specifics have an impact 
on R&D activity. If a company is sufficiently profitable, it can draw on internal financing for 
R&D expenditure and does not have to rely on outside financing. Therefore a positive relation 
between R&D and profitability can be expected (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Hall, 2002; 
Hall and Lerner, 2010). However, if a high share of available financing is invested into fixed 
assets other than R&D equipment, fewer resources are free to be directed into R&D, which 
would in turn result in a lower R&D intensity. Bigger and older firms may be expected to 
have a higher R&D intensity as product and process innovations of established firms in ma-
ture markets might require intense R&D activity (Cohen and Levin, 1989). On the other hand, 
R&D activity might not be as necessary for firms with a secure market position as for young 
firms trying to take root in the market. Empirical results on the relationship between size, age 
and R&D activities are thus mixed (see Nyström, 2009, for an overview). Moreover, as hu-
man capital is needed to perform R&D, R&D intensity and human capital of business owners 
and employees are positively related (Romer, 1990). 
The relationship between R&D activity and firms’ financing structure can also be argued not 
to go from financing to R&D, but in the opposite direction. There are two main approaches 
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competing to explain firms’ capital structure and especially leverage (see Frank and Goyal, 
2008, for a recent overview). First, trade-off theory assumes that equating marginal benefits 
and costs of debt results in an optimal level of leverage, deviations from which are reduced 
over time. Second, pecking order theory emphasises different degrees of asymmetric infor-
mation associated with different types of external financing. In consequence, different costs of 
capital and different rights requested by capital suppliers result in a preference ordering of 
financing sources (Ross, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Whether trade-off theory or variants of the pecking order hypothesis explain observed capital 
structure decisions better is still an open question (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Adedeji, 2002; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008). However, 
both approaches share a number of capital structure determinants which are related to R&D 
expenditure. First, growth prospects are often approximated by R&D expenditure (e.g., Chang 
et al., 2009). Second, R&D expenditure is rather allocated into intangible than into tangible 
assets that cannot be used as collateral. About 60% of R&D expenditure by enterprises in 
Germany can be attributed to labour costs (Eurostat, 2010, own calculations). Even in the 
manufacturing industry and in knowledge-intensive service sectors only one third of innova-
tion spending goes into capital equipment—including intangible assets like patent rights—, 
whereas two thirds go into expenditure on personnel and service agreements with third parties 
(Rammer, 2009: 35). Third, empirical studies find a positive relation between innovation in-
puts like R&D expenditure on the one hand and firm profitability resp. productivity on the 
other (e.g., Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010; Geroski et al., 1993; Hall et al., 2009). So there are 
different mechanisms for R&D expenditure to influence financing leverage.1 
2.2 Particular Properties of Young Firms 
Analyses of business start-ups have to take into account special characteristics of young and 
small firms. This is particularly important for financing decisions. First, capital structure theo-
ries predict an influence of firm age and firm size on leverage. According to trade-off theory, 
debt financing should be positively related to firm size because larger firms exhibit a smaller 
probability of default (López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Cole, 2008). Empirical evidence 
generally supports this hypothesis (Cassar, 2004). Second, potential information asymmetries 
between lenders and entrepreneurs decrease as firms mature, since older firms can provide 
lenders with more information about the acceptance of their products in the market and about 
                                                     
1 Note that the respective effects on firms’ debt share implied by trade-off theory or pecking order theory can be 
contradictory. 
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their performance in terms of sales or profits. In addition, start-up investments require a high-
er financing volume than early follow-up and expansion investments. Therefore, there should 
be a negative relationship between firm age and loan financing according to pecking order 
theory (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Higher financing needs and a lower probability of receiv-
ing external financing generate opposing influences on the structure of start-up financing.  
Start-ups and young enterprises are largely dependent on their owners and the boundaries be-
tween firms as organisations and entrepreneurs as persons are often not clear-cut (Astebro and 
Bernhardt, 2003; Cassar, 2004). Financing decisions of young firms thus rely disproportion-
ately on the preferences of the business founders, e.g. regarding risk and control over the firm 
(Bhaird and Lucey, 2010; Ang, 1992; Storey, 1994; Heger and Tykvova, 2009; Frielinghaus 
et al., 2005). Entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics like gender, age, migration background 
or start-up experience are often included into empirical analyses of start-up financing (e.g., 
Achleitner et al., 2011; Kohn and Ullrich, 2010; Winston Smith, 2010; Coleman and Robb, 
2009; Cassar, 2004; Blanchflower et al., 2003; Verheul and Thurik, 2001; Cavalluzzo and 
Cavalluzzo, 1998).  
Another special aspect of start-up financing is the fact that external means are rather diversi-
fied compared to the financing mix of mature firms. A considerable share of business start-
ups employs informal capital from family and friends besides financial means of the founders 
(Cole, 2008; Cosh et al., 2009; Eckhardt et al., 2006; Gompers and Lerner, 2006; Hagen et al., 
2011; Hutchinson, 1995; Kohn and Spengler, 2008). In addition, start-up promotion by gov-
ernment and public financing programmes are readily available in Germany. This institutional 
setting may divert young firms’ debt shares from those predicted by traditional financing the-
ories. 
An analogous argument as to the close connection between entrepreneurs as persons and firms 
as organisations applies to R&D activity. Usually, founders themselves decide about expendi-
ture on R&D devoted to their business ideas. The decisions can again be expected to be influ-
enced by human capital components such as educational background or previous business 
experience. Furthermore, entrepreneurs’ risk aversion can play a role in face of the uncertain 
outcome of R&D activity. However, Heaton and Lucas (2004) argue that a substitution of 
internal financing by debt lowers entrepreneurs’ personal exposure to firms’ idiosyncratic 
risk, increasing the incentive to carry out a risky R&D project. According to Hellmann and 
Puri (2000) the use of outside equity induces young firms to introduce innovative products to 
the market faster than firms obtaining financial means from other sources of financing. 
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3 Data and Descriptive Analyses 
This paper’s empirical investigation uses data from the first two waves of the KfW/ZEW 
Start-up Panel (KfW/ZEW-Gründungspanel), a unique data set built up recently by the Centre 
for European Economic Research (ZEW), KfW Bankengruppe (Germany’s largest state-
owned promotional bank) and Creditreform (Germany’s largest credit rating agency). The 
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel is a large-scale yearly telephone survey (computer-aided telephone 
interviews, CATI) of young firms in Germany. It covers newly founded legally independent 
firms that are run by at least one full-time entrepreneur. De-mergers and subsidiaries are ex-
cluded from the survey.2 
The sample of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel is stratified by three criteria: industry (10 sectors 
as defined in Table 6 in the appendix), year of firm formation, and whether or not the firm has 
been promoted by KfW. The design of the survey offers two main advantages for the purpose 
of this paper. First, while the panel covers almost all industry sectors,3 one half of all firms 
included in the stratified sample operate in a high-technology industry. Therefore, young 
technology-based firms which are of particular interest to the study of R&D activity are nota-
bly overrepresented in the data. Second, the survey questionnaire collects not only detailed 
information on firm specifics but also personal information about the entrepreneurs, including 
their human capital endowment and personal wealth. The latter in particular may be an im-
portant driver of financing patterns. 
The first survey wave was conducted in the year 2008, collecting data on 5,508 firms founded 
in the period from 2005 to 2007. The second survey wave, conducted in 2009, included firms 
from the foundation cohorts 2005 to 2008 and resulted in a net sample size of 5,638 firms. In 
this paper we use a pooled data set containing data from both the first and the second survey 
wave.4 
                                                     
2 See Fryges et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the design of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
3 The only sectors excluded are agriculture, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply, health care, 
and the public sector. 
4 Descriptive statistics reported below use population weights in order to account for the stratification design of 
the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. As unweighted sample results are likely to deviate from the results documented in 
the text, we also report unweighted descriptives in the appendix (Table 7 and Table 8 corresponding to Table 1 
and Table 2). Throughout the paper, all statistics of absolute values are calculated without extreme values below 
the 1st or above the 99th percentiles. Only the variable ‘number of employees’ does not exclude largest values. 
The inclusion of firms with one per cent lowest or highest values basically leads to the same conclusions (results 
available from the authors on request). 
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3.1 Financing Structure of Young Firms 
In the course of the survey interview, firms are asked to indicate the amount of money they 
spent, on the one hand, on investment in fixed assets and, on the other hand, on operating 
costs. Both data are measured for the calendar year prior to the survey year. Expenditure on 
investment and operating costs sum up to firms’ total financing needs. On average, financing 
needs of young German firms amount to about 112,000 Euro per year. The median amounts to 
only 36,000 Euro. Therefore, the distribution of financing needs is highly skewed to the right. 
One reason for this observation is the fact that financing needs also contain salaries for em-
ployees—while 45% of all young firms do not have any employees. Moreover, in case of sole 
proprietorships or private companies, owners’ income is paid from firms’ profits and is not 
part of operating costs. As a consequence, many firms have only small financing needs: 37% 
of firms exhibit financing needs of 20,000 Euro or less per year. 
With respect to the sources of financing, the questionnaire follows a two-stage approach. At 
the first stage, three types of financial resources are distinguished: revenues generated from 
sales or retained earnings, founders’ own means (such as personal savings used for firm start-
up), and capital from external third-party providers. Firms indicated whether or not they used 
the different sources and—if so—the shares of total financing needs covered by the respective 
sources. At the second stage, the questionnaire differentiates nine sources of external financ-
ing: overdraft credits, long-term bank loans, promotional loans from KfW or financial institu-
tions of the German states, gifts and loans from relatives and friends, subsidies from the Fed-
eral Employment Agency, equity capital, mezzanine capital, and other sources of external 
financing.5 Again, firms are asked to indicate whether or not they used particular sources to 
cover their external financing needs, and the corresponding volume shares in external capital 
from third-party providers.6  
Table 1 summarises firms’ financing structure. 92% of firms generate revenues from sales 
(first column of Table 1) and on average, firms cover three fourths of their financing needs by 
this source (second column of Table 1). The median of this share amounts to 100%, i.e. oper-
ating costs and expenditure for investments are usually financed completely from internal 
                                                     
5 Regarding the latter residual category, only a very small number of firms (48 observations) reported to have 
used ‘other sources’. These firms are disregarded in our empirical analysis.  
6 Note that the approach does not focus on the point in time when owners or other third parties provide financial 
means to the firms. Instead, the focus is on the calendar year in which the provided capital is actually used to 
cover the firms’ financing needs. For example, a firm may receive a high amount of venture capital or a large 
bank loan in its start-up year, but use this money to finance expenditures in both the first and subsequent busi-
ness years. 
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sources. On the other hand, the 10th percentile of this value is equal to 5%. During their first 
years of existence a significant percentage of young firms in Germany cover only a small 
share of their expenses via sales revenues.  
Financial means provided by firms’ owners are the second most important source of finance. 
46% of firms use this source and the average volume share is 18% of a firm’s total expendi-
ture. Capital from third-party providers is used by 27% of firms. Related to all firms, the aver-
age share of third-party capital in total financing is about 8%. However, the importance of 
third-party capital varies significantly among firms. If we confine our sample to those 27% of 
firms which actually use at least one third-party capital provider, the average share of financ-
ing needs that is covered by capital from third parties reaches a value of 37% and the 90th per-
centile amounts to 88%. 
Table 1: Financing structure 
 Share of all firms using the source of 
finance (%) Average share in total financing (%) 
Revenues from sales/retained 
profits 91.6 74.5 
Founders’ own means 45.8 17.5 
Capital from third parties 27.2 8.0 
 Share of all firms using capital from third parties (%)
Average share in total capital received 
from third parties (%)
 Bank loans 69.7 57.7 
 Promotional loans  10.8 6.0 
 Relatives and friends  27.7 17.2 
 Subsidies from Federal  
 Employment Agency 28.6 15.6 
 Equity capital 5.9 3.6 
 Loan financing a 74.1 63.7 
Population-weighted results. a Bank loans and promotional loans. 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
Among the various sources of external finance from third parties, traditional bank loans 
(overdraft credits and long-term bank loans) are of particular importance. Among those firms 
which actually use capital from third parties, 70% use bank loans (lower panel of Table 1). On 
average, bank loans account for 58% of total third-party financing. A corresponding 11% of 
firms benefit from promotional loans. 6% of external capital from third parties is, on average, 
allocated to promotional loans. 
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Gifts and loans from relatives and friends as well as start-up subsidies from the Federal Em-
ployment Agency also contribute notably to external financing. The average share of third-
party capital that is provided by relatives and friends amounts to 17%, subsidies from the 
Federal Employment Agency for formerly unemployed persons average to 16%. Yet the 
amount of subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency is usually small. For individual 
firms, these subsidies may play a substantial role in financing, in particular for very small 
firms set up by formerly unemployed persons. However, regarding the total volume of finan-
cial capital young firms are endowed with, subsidies for unemployed persons play a subordi-
nate role. 
Equity capital from venture capital companies or business angels (including mezzanine capi-
tal) accounts for only a small average share in third-party financing (4%). This result is due to 
the fact that only 6% of firms receiving capital from third parties are financed by venture 
capital companies or business angels. Nevertheless, those firms which actually benefit from 
equity capital may receive a substantial amount of money from venture capital companies.7 
In the econometric model in section 4, financial leverage is measured by the share of loan 
financing in total financing needs. Loan financing combines four sources of financing: over-
draft credits, long-term bank loans, and promotional loans from KfW and from financial insti-
tutions of the German states. The last row of Table 1 displays that 74% of all firms using ex-
ternal capital from third-party providers rely on loan financing. Loans account for the lion’s 
share of third-party financing: About 64% of total third-party capital stems from bank loans or 
promotional loans. 
3.2 R&D Activities in Young Firms 
13% of the firms carried out own R&D activities in the year of observation. Firms with R&D 
activities spend an average of 24,300 Euro per annum on R&D (Table 2). Expenditure on 
R&D includes expenses for investments in machinery or facilities for R&D projects, labour 
costs for personnel involved in R&D activities, and payments to third parties for R&D con-
tracts. The distribution of R&D expenditure is highly skewed to the right: One half of firms 
with own R&D activities spend 10.000 Euro or less on R&D, whereas the one percent of 
firms with highest R&D expenditure spends 200.000 Euro or more. 
                                                     
7 The 99th percentile of equity money spent to cover financials needs amounts to 660,000 Euro. 
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Table 2: R&D activities 
 
# of obser-
vations 
 Percentiles 
 Mean 25% 50% 75% 
Average expenditure on R&D (Euro) 1,748 24,300 2,000 10,000 25,000 
R&D intensity (%) 1,383 24.7 1.7 7.0 20.8 
Population-weighted results. Numbers referring to firms conducting own R&D activities. R&D intensity measured as ex-
penditure on R&D over total sales. R&D expenditure and total sales are trimmed by excluding values above the 99th percen-
tiles. 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
In the econometric model below we analyse firms’ R&D intensity as defined by the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total sales. This measure scales different firm sizes in the analysis of 
R&D activity. As reported in Table 2, the mean R&D intensity of firms with own R&D ac-
tivities is 25%, the corresponding median 7%. However, since the firms in our sample are 
very young, there are firms whose expenditure on R&D even exceeds the volume of total 
sales (2.5% of firms with own R&D activities). In some firms the development of new prod-
ucts or services lasts several years, with high R&D expenditure going hand in hand with only 
a small-sized volume of sales during firms’ initial years.  
3.3 Relationship of R&D and Financial Leverage 
Table 3 summarises the observed relationship between loan financing and R&D activities. 
First, we divide our sample into two groups – firms with R&D activities and firms that are not 
engaged in R&D – and compare the distribution of financial leverage for these two groups of 
firms. Second, we compare the distribution of R&D intensity for those firms that use loan 
financing with the distribution among firms that do not use loan financing. 
As reported in the upper panel of Table 3, the mean share of loan financing is higher in the 
group of firms without R&D activities. This is true for both the complete sample and the re-
duced sample of those firms that actually use loan financing. However, the difference in 
means is statistically significant only in the latter case. Non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests for stochastic dominance consider additional moments of the distributions (see Conover, 
1999: 456ff.). We test three hypotheses: (1) whether the distribution of financial leverage is 
different for firms with and without R&D activities at all, (2) whether the distribution of lev-
erage among firms conducting R&D first order stochastically dominates the distribution of 
leverage among firms without R&D activities, and (3) the reverse case. In case of the com-
plete sample, all three hypotheses have to be rejected. However, among firms with loan fi-
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nancing, the first and the third hypothesis cannot be rejected: In bivariate comparison, firms 
without R&D expenditure use a higher share of loan financing. 
The lower panel of Table 3 displays corresponding results for the distributions of R&D inten-
sity among firms with and without financial leverage. While we observe a lower mean of 
R&D intensity among firms that use loan financing, the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. In addition, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject all three hypotheses of stochastic dom-
inance in case of the complete sample. Yet in the small subsample of firms which actually do 
R&D, we find that the distribution of R&D intensity of firms without loan financing signifi-
cantly dominates the distribution of R&D intensity of firms with a positive financial leverage: 
In bivariate comparison, firms that do not use loan financing have a higher R&D intensity. 
In summation, descriptive statistics show a negative relationship between loan financing and 
R&D activities of young firms. This result corresponds to previous studies demonstrating that 
loan financing plays a subordinate role for the financing of R&D activities. Firms may rather 
rely on other sources like sales or retained earnings from previous years (i.e. internal financ-
ing) or on venture capital. Whether this result also holds in a multivariate context is examined 
in the regression analysis below. 
Table 3: Loan financing and R&D activities 
Tests for differences in the share of loan financing between firms with and without R&D activities 
 Mean share of loan  
financing (%) 
t-test for differ-
ence in means 
(p-value) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-value) 
 R&D No R&D Difference: yes
R&D >  
no R&D 
no R&D > 
R&D
Complete sample 6.1 6.4 0.491 0.987 0.669 0.738 
Reduced sample a 30.2 33.6 0.028 0.020 0.992 0.012 
Test for differences in R&D intensity between firms with and without loan financing 
 Mean R&D intensity (%) 
t-test for differ-
ence in means 
(p-value) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-value) 
 Loans No loans Difference: yes
Loans >  
no loans 
No loans > 
loan
Complete sample 4.8 7.3 0.320 0.863 0.991 0.492 
Reduced sample a 25.6 38.7 0.317 0.042 0.942 0.025 
All tests are based on unweighted sample statistics. 
a The reduced sample includes all firms that actually receive loan financing (conduct R&D activities). 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
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3.4 Operationalisation of Explanatory Variables 
The literature review in section 2 emphasises that both financial leverage and R&D intensity 
are determined by firm-specific characteristics like firms’ tangible and intangible assets, and 
by specifics of the entrepreneurs such as human capital variables. We operationalise explana-
tory variables as follows. 
Firm size is captured by the (logarithmic) number of employees including the (team of) 
founder(s), measured in full-time equivalents. Since the size effect is likely to be non-linear, 
we also include the squared value. In addition, a dummy variable characterises firms that were 
set up by a team of founders. Firm age is covered by a set of dummy variables indicating 
firms between one and four years of age.  
We measure profitability by the ratio of profits to total sales. Since firms can experience loss-
es in single years of observation, this ratio can be negative. The composition of a firm’s profit 
depends on the legal form of the firm: In case of a private company or partnership the income 
of the entrepreneur is a part of the firm’s profit. On the contrary, managing partners of an in-
corporated firm receive a salary and the firm’s profit is calculated net of entrepreneurs’ in-
come. As a result, the profit-to-sales ratio may vary between firms with different legal forms. 
In order to account for this effect, we interact the profitability measure with a dummy variable 
for incorporated companies. The latter variable enters the regression equations as an addition-
al control variable. 
Tangibility of assets is approximated by expenditure on investments in fixed assets over total 
financing needs. Tangible assets can serve as collateral for loans and so can entrepreneurs’ 
personal wealth. We measure entrepreneurs’ personal wealth as the value of assets like per-
sonal bank deposits, bonds or real estate, net of personal debt not linked to entrepreneurial 
activities. Personal wealth is divided by firms’ total financing needs. This measure indicates 
the share of a year’s financing needs that can be covered by entrepreneurs’ personal wealth. 
Intangible assets are first measured by a dummy variable indicating whether or not firms have 
at least one employee working in an occupation that requires a university degree. This meas-
ure mirrors human capital among firms’ employees. Second, R&D intensity itself serves as a 
proxy for intangible assets in the financing equation. Expenditure on R&D includes invest-
ment in machines required to conduct R&D projects. However, the majority of R&D expendi-
ture is allotted to personnel expenses (Rammer, 2009). Thus, R&D intensity is appropriate to 
approximate the share of sales a firm spends on the creation of knowledge to gain, e.g., a 
competitive advantage due to a newly developed technology. Both R&D intensity and human 
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capital of firms’ employees are decisive for the future development of young firms, so these 
two variables can also be interpreted as proxies for future growth opportunities.  
However, human capital of the founders themselves might be even more important for future 
growth perspectives of young and small firms. Our regression models thus contain a dummy 
variable characterising firms in which at least one member of the team of founders has ob-
tained a university degree. General working experience of the entrepreneurs is measured by 
their age (in logarithmic years). In addition, we distinguish three groups of entrepreneurs with 
respect to previous entrepreneurial experience: (1) those who had never started a business 
before; (2) those with only negative entrepreneurial experience in the sense that all former 
firms of the entrepreneurs failed and exited from the market; and (3) those with positive en-
trepreneurial experience, i.e. successful entrepreneurs who had founded at least one other firm 
in the past which would still be run by the entrepreneur or had been handed over to a succes-
sor or sold to an investor. 
Entrepreneurs are further discriminated according to their start-up motives. We employ a 
standard necessity-opportunity dichotomy based on founders’ own assessment. Necessity en-
trepreneurs start their businesses in lack of other employment alternatives, primarily in order 
to end unemployment or to circumvent foreseeable unemployment. In contrast, opportunity 
entrepreneurs are motivated primarily by the chance to commercialise a particular business 
idea or because they aspire to work independently. The vector of entrepreneur-specific varia-
bles is completed by two dummy variables indicating firms that were founded by female en-
trepreneurs and entrepreneurs with a migrational background, respectively. 
Finally, our regressions include sets of dummy variables for the stratification criteria industry 
sector (ten sectors described in Table 6 in the appendix), year of survey wave (observation in 
the years 2007 and 2008), and promotion by KfW. Table 9 in the appendix documents the 
wording in the questionnaire for all explanatory variables and also reports mean and median 
values based on those observations that enter the regressions. 
4 Regression Analysis 
4.1 Determinants of Financial Leverage: Single Equation Approach 
Since many firms do not use loan financing, the distribution of loan share has a masspoint at 
the value of zero. Following Wooldridge (2001: 517ff.), we use type I Tobit models to esti-
mate the determinants of the corner solution outcomes 
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(1a)  *max 0, 0 i iloanshare loanshare . 
The latent share of loan financing loansharei* of all start-ups i = 1, 2, … , N is specified as  
(1b) * 1 1 1 1+  i i i i iloanshare rdint z x u   , 
where irdint  denotes R&D intensity, iz  is a vector of explanatory firm characteristics, ix  is a 
vector of personal characteristics of the entrepreneurs, and 1 1 1 1( , , )       is a parameter 
vector. Assuming normality of the error term 1iu , the model can be estimated via maximum 
likelihood. The results of this regression are depicted in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.8 
Specification (1) includes a full set of firm and entrepreneur-related characteristics. As ex-
pected, the financing decision is related to several characteristics of the young firm. In partic-
ular, we find a concave effect of firm size: the higher the number of employees in small firms, 
the higher is the share of loan financing because young firms need to cover wage costs by 
external capital. Yet larger firms realise more sizable sales which contribute to covering wage 
costs and so the effect diminishes in larger firms. The effect of firm age is monotonically neg-
ative. The necessity of loan financing declines when firms mature and generate more sales to 
be used as an internal financing source. Incorporated firms have a lower share of loan financ-
ing because compulsory capital contributions of the owners can be used to finance initial in-
vestments and first operating costs. In addition, asset tangibility plays an important role: the 
higher the share of financed investments in total financing needs, the higher is the share of 
loans in the financing mix. Apparently, fixed assets are in fact used as collateral in loan fi-
nancing. In contrast, there are no significant effects of firm profitability or the existence of 
high-skilled employees. Human capital of the employed personnel does not influence firms’ 
financing structure. 
This also holds true for human capital of the founders themselves: university graduates use 
neither more nor less loan financing than non-academic starters. What is more, all other in-
cluded indicators for founders’ socio-demographics turn out insignificant as well. Neither 
gender nor migrational status, neither general nor specific entrepreneurial experience contrib-
ute to explaining financial leverage. However, necessity entrepreneurs use less loan financing 
than opportunity entrepreneurs. On the one hand, starters from unemployment are often eligi-
ble for start-up subsidies. On the other hand, necessity entrepreneurs rely on informal money  
 
                                                     
8 The results were obtained using the statistical software package STATA, version 11. To estimate the bivariate 
Tobit model we applied the STATA-based programme mvtobit, written by Mikkel Barslund. 
 15
Table 4: Estimation of the financing equation 
Dependent variable:  
Share of loan financing 
(1) 
Single-equation Tobit 
(2) 
Single-equation Tobit 
(3) 
Two-equation Tobit 
Coeff. Robuststd. err. Coeff.
Robust
std. err.  Coeff. 
Robust
std. err.
R&D intensity 0.028 0.029  0.028 0.029  0.441 0.071 *** 
Number of employees (ln) 0.122 0.034 *** 0.122 0.034 *** 0.105 0.032 *** 
Number of employees (ln) ² -0.019 0.012  -0.019 0.012  -0.013 0.011  
Profitability -0.044 0.034  -0.044 0.034  -0.025 0.029  
Profitability * incorporated firm 0.045 0.034  0.045 0.034  0.029 0.030  
Incorporated firm -0.046 0.027 * -0.047 0.027 * -0.065 0.026 ** 
Investments/financing needs 0.399 0.040 *** 0.399 0.040 *** 0.333 0.040 *** 
Firm age: 2 years -0.082 0.025 *** -0.082 0.025 *** -0.079 0.024 *** 
  3 years -0.159 0.027 *** -0.159 0.027 *** -0.148 0.026 *** 
  4 years -0.184 0.036 *** -0.184 0.036 *** -0.181 0.034 *** 
Team of entrepreneurs 0.008 0.026  0.007 0.026  0.017 0.025  
Employees with required univ. degree -0.022 0.032  -0.022 0.032  -0.033 0.031  
Entrepreneur with university degree 0.018 0.023  0.018 0.023  0.002 0.022  
Female entrepreneurs only 0.021 0.034  0.021 0.034  0.021 0.032  
Entrepreneurs with foreign origin only 0.057 0.047  0.058 0.047  0.043 0.046  
Age of the oldest entrepreneur (ln) -0.010 0.042     
Positive entrepreneurial experience -0.001 0.027  -0.002 0.027  -0.005 0.026  
Negative entrepren. experience only -0.009 0.032  -0.010 0.032  -0.019 0.030  
Necessity entrepreneur -0.087 0.029 *** -0.088 0.028 *** -0.084 0.027 *** 
Personal wealth/financing needs -0.005 0.001 *** -0.005 0.001 *** -0.005 0.001 *** 
 Dummy for missing values -0.083 0.022 *** -0.084 0.022 *** -0.086 0.020 *** 
Industry (ref. consumer-or. services)     
 Cutting-edge technology manuf. 0.032 0.051  0.032 0.051  -0.009 0.050  
 High-technology manufacturing 0.062 0.051  0.061 0.051  0.042 0.049  
 Technology-intensive services -0.080 0.041 ** -0.080 0.041 ** -0.075 0.038 * 
 Software -0.173 0.056 *** -0.172 0.055 *** -0.167 0.051 *** 
 Non-high-tech manufacturing 0.049 0.041  0.049 0.041  0.043 0.039  
 Skill-intensive services -0.025 0.047  -0.025 0.047  -0.026 0.045  
 Other business-oriented services 0.006 0.050  0.006 0.050  -0.001 0.048  
 Construction 0.001 0.041  0.002 0.041  -0.001 0.040  
 Wholesale and retail trade -0.013 0.040  -0.013 0.040  -0.009 0.038  
Observation year 2008 0.080 0.020 *** 0.080 0.020 *** 0.071 0.019 *** 
Integer -0.494 0.156 *** -0.530 0.050 *** -0.474 0.052 *** 
 0.440 0.012 *** 0.440 0.012 *** 0.433 0.012 *** 
   -0.582 0.047 *** 
Number of observations 4,299 4,299 4,299 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,708.77 -1,708.80 -3,404.90 
Pseudo R² 0.175 0.175 0.173 
Standard errors are clustered by firm identifier. */**/*** 10%/5%/1% level of significance. Additional control variable indi-
cating firms promoted by KfW included. Base category: consumer oriented service firm, observed in its first business year, 
observation year 2007, no member of the team of founders has previous entrepreneurial experience at the time of start-up. All 
absolute values used to calculate ratios are trimmed by excluding values below the 1st or above the 99th percentiles. 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel.  
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from family and friends to a higher degree. The effect of founders’ personal wealth on the 
share of loan financing is significantly negative. More wealthy entrepreneurs can put higher 
amounts of own money into their business and therefore reduce the necessity of using loans to 
meet given financial needs. 
Controlling for a broad range of firm and entrepreneur-related characteristics, there are only 
few differences with respect to industry. Compared to firms operating in the reference indus-
try ‘consumer-oriented services’, software firms and technology-intensive service firms have 
a lower share of loan financing. Start-ups in these industries often require specific human cap-
ital and produce intangible assets. This reduces firms’ ability to take out loans. 
Finally, the effect of R&D intensity estimated in specification (1) turns out insignificant and 
negligible in size. The negative correlation of loan share and R&D intensity observed in the 
bivariate comparison above thus results from selection of firms based on third-party variables 
x and z. The share of loan financing is mainly determined by requirements of the start-up pro-
ject while socio-demographic characteristics of the entrepreneurs only play a negligible role. 
It is therefore valid to leave out insignificant personal characteristics from the estimation. 
Specification (2) in Table 4 specifically leaves out age of the entrepreneur from the list of 
covariates. This exclusion also makes sense from an economic point of view. From a demand-
side perspective, business starters direct the financing structure to the needs of their projects 
and – controlling for other personal characteristics such as industry experience – start-up pro-
jects do not differ systematically between age groups. From a supply-side perspective, banks 
focus on the expected quality of the project and the reliability of the entrepreneur. They may 
take human capital of the entrepreneur, and in particular educational attainment and previous 
start-up experience, as a signal for creditworthiness (Werner, 2007). Yet within the range of 
prime age, age itself plays no role. 
The coefficients estimated in specification (2) – including the effect of R&D intensity – do 
basically not differ from those estimated in specification (1). This result substantiates the ex-
clusion restriction discussed above.9 
                                                     
9 In an additional specification (results available from the authors upon request) we leave out all person-related 
variables. Again, the estimated coefficients of the firm variables including R&D intensity stay basically the 
same.  
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4.2 Determinants of R&D Intensity: Single Equation Approach 
Turning to the determinants of R&D intensity, we note that the distribution of R&D intensity 
rdinti also has a mass point at the value of zero because the majority of young firms do not 
conduct own R&D activities. We thus specify 
(2a)  max 0, 0 *i irdint rdint , 
(2b) 2 2 2 2+  *i i i i irdint loanshare z x u    
in notational analogy to equation (1). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report results from the 
single equation Tobit model of the R&D equation. 
First of all, there are considerable differences across industries. Firms operating in cutting-
edge or high-technology manufacturing, in technology-intensive services, or in the software 
industry have a higher R&D intensity. This result reflects the definition of high-tech indus-
tries which explicitly uses the (industry average) ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales (cf. 
Table 6 in the appendix). However, there is also sizeable heterogeneity within the non-high-
tech sector. Non-high-tech manufacturers and skill-intensive service firms have a higher R&D 
intensity than firms in the reference sector ‘consumer-oriented services’, while the lowest 
R&D intensity is observed in the construction industry. 
In addition to industry differences, both firm characteristics and personal characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs play a significant role in both specifications (1) and (2). We find an inverted U-
shape pattern for the effect of firm size: on the one hand, small firms with no or very few em-
ployees do usually not employ research personnel and seldom conduct R&D projects. On the 
other hand, research expenditure declines in relative terms as firms grow large. Incorporated 
firms, which usually have a more formalised organisational structure than non-incorporated 
firms, have a higher R&D intensity. A higher share of investment costs in total financing 
needs also comes along with a higher R&D intensity: physical capital and R&D activity are 
often complements in firms’ production process. Investments in large, specialised machinery 
for R&D purposes clearly increase the amount of R&D expenditure. 
Moreover, engagement in R&D requires some human capital intensity. As a consequence 
firms founded by academic entrepreneurs as well as those employing workers with a universi-
ty degree are significantly more R&D-intensive. Founders’ previous entrepreneurial experi-
ence – both positive and negative – also comes along with a higher R&D intensity. Apparent-
ly, experienced entrepreneurs judge the importance of R&D more easily and put a higher 
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Table 5: Estimation of the R&D equation 
Dependent variable:  
R&D intensity 
(1) 
Single-equation Tobit 
(2) 
Single-equation Tobit 
(3) 
Two-equation Tobit 
Coeff. Robuststd. err. Coeff.
Robust
std. err. Coeff. 
Robust
std. err. 
Share of loan financing -0.059 0.123 -0.053 0.124 1.585 0.292 *** 
Number of employees (ln) 0.158 0.065 ** 0.160 0.066 ** 0.118 0.058 ** 
Number of employees (ln) ² -0.053 0.021 ** -0.053 0.021 ** -0.039 0.019 ** 
Profitability -0.091 0.079 -0.092 0.079 -0.059 0.064 
Profitability * incorporated firm 0.089 0.079 0.089 0.079 0.057 0.064 
Incorporated firm 0.355 0.069 *** 0.351 0.068 *** 0.326 0.060 *** 
Investments/financing needs 0.462 0.104 *** 0.461 0.104 *** 0.266 0.081 *** 
Firm age: 2 years 0.079 0.054 0.081 0.054 0.119 0.052 ** 
  3 years 0.075 0.051 0.075 0.051 0.129 0.050 ** 
  4 years 0.011 0.065 0.011 0.066 0.049 0.062 
Team of entrepreneurs -0.075 0.051 -0.075 0.051 -0.063 0.046 
Employees with required univ. degree 0.204 0.054 *** 0.205 0.054 *** 0.197 0.052 *** 
Entrepreneur with university degree 0.236 0.051 *** 0.233 0.051 *** 0.195 0.044 *** 
Female entrepreneurs only -0.115 0.077 -0.116 0.077 -0.113 0.072 
Entrepreneurs with foreign origin only -0.026 0.088 -0.031 0.088 -0.081 0.085 
Age of the oldest entrepreneur (ln) -0.215 0.081 *** -0.223 0.082 *** -0.191 0.074 ** 
Positive entrepreneurial experience 0.180 0.055 *** 0.179 0.055 *** 0.157 0.050 *** 
Negative entrepren. experience only 0.092 0.052 * 0.095 0.053 * 0.061 0.050 
Necessity entrepreneur -0.105 0.061 * -0.104 0.061 * -0.085 0.057 
Personal wealth/financing needs 0.000 0.001   
 Dummy for missing value -0.057 0.037   
Industry (ref. consumer-or. services)    
 Cutting-edge technology manuf. 0.461 0.120 *** 0.469 0.121 *** 0.395 0.106 *** 
 High-technology manufacturing 0.362 0.092 *** 0.362 0.092 *** 0.286 0.086 *** 
 Technology-intensive services 0.145 0.081 * 0.150 0.082 * 0.158 0.075 ** 
 Software 0.375 0.090 *** 0.379 0.091 *** 0.378 0.085 *** 
 Non-high-tech manufacturing 0.141 0.079 * 0.144 0.079 * 0.092 0.075 
 Skill-intensive services 0.148 0.085 * 0.152 0.085 * 0.138 0.080 * 
 Other business-oriented services -0.064 0.098 -0.060 0.098 -0.082 0.094 
 Construction -0.278 0.104 *** -0.273 0.103 *** -0.247 0.097 ** 
 Wholesale and retail trade -0.155 0.094 * -0.150 0.094 -0.142 0.088 
Observation year 2008 -0.097 0.039 ** -0.095 0.039 ** -0.082 0.035 ** 
Integer -0.540 0.307 * -0.534 0.306 * -0.567 0.280 ** 
 0.716 0.089 *** 0.716 0.089 *** 0.704 0.085 *** 
    -0.582 0.047 *** 
Number of observations 4,299 4,299 4,299 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,721.31 -1,722.56 -3,404.90 
Pseudo R² 0.159 0.158 0.173 
Standard errors are clustered by firm identifier. */**/*** 10%/5%/1% level of significance. Additional control variable indi-
cating firms promoted by KfW included. Base category: consumer oriented service firm, observed in its first business year, 
observation year 2007, no member of the team of founders has previous entrepreneurial experience at the time of start-up. All 
absolute values used to calculate ratios are trimmed by excluding values below the 1st or above the 99th percentiles. 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
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weight on their own R&D activities. Firms run by female entrepreneurs are slightly less in-
clined to do R&D, and so are firms started by older entrepreneurs. On the contrary, personal 
wealth of the founders has no effect on R&D intensity. The decision to do R&D and the ex-
tent of necessary R&D expenditure are closely related to the business idea itself and the 
knowledge intensity of the involved technology. With respect to the evolution of research-
based business ideas, human capital is more important than private wealth. As it turns out, the 
estimated coefficient of private wealth is both negligible in size and statistically insignificant. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to exclude the private wealth variable from the R&D equation. 
Estimates from the reduced specification (2) in Table 5 are basically the same as the results 
from the baseline specification (1).  
Controlling for firm and entrepreneur-related characteristics, the effect of loan share on R&D 
intensity turns out negligible and statistically insignificant in both specifications (1) and (2). 
Comparing this result to the negative correlation observed in bivariate comparison emphasises 
the importance to account for selection based on third-party variables. 
4.3 Accounting for Simultaneity of Financial Leverage and R&D Intensity 
The selection based on observable characteristics is such that firms opt for a particular financ-
ing structure and, at the same time, choose an R&D regime. Looking at, for instance, the ef-
fect of incorporation, the necessity for loan financing goes down (due to equity financing of 
the owners). At the same time, corporate firms are more R&D intensive than non-incorporated 
ones. Disregarding the effects of firm and entrepreneur-related differences results in a spuri-
ously negative correlation between R&D intensity and the share of loan financing. However, 
it is likely that both variables of interest are additionally affected by common unobserved 
shocks. In this case, the error terms of equations (1) and (2) would be correlated across equa-
tions. 
In order to account for this possibility, we employ a bivariate Tobit model and estimate equa-
tions (1) and (2) simultaneously, assuming joint normality of the error terms 
),( 21 ii uu ~  2 21 2 120; , ,N    , with variances 21  and 22  and correlation coefficient 12 . Iden-
tification is achieved by excluding age of the entrepreneur from equation (1) and personal 
wealth from equation (2). As discussed above, age of the entrepreneur is significantly corre-
lated to R&D intensity but can reasonably be assumed to have no effect on the share of loan 
financing. Analogously, entrepreneurs’ private wealth has an effect on financing decisions but 
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is not related to R&D intensity. Estimated coefficients for the two equations are displayed in 
columns (3) of Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. 
Most importantly, the effects of the respective endogenous regressors turn positive and signif-
icant. An increase in R&D intensity ceteris paribus results in an increase in the share of loan 
financing. In turn, an increase in the share of loan financing ceteris paribus results in an in-
crease in R&D intensity. The stability condition 1 2 1    is fulfilled and the estimation is 
logically consistent (Amemiya, 1974): 1 2ˆ ˆ 0.699 1     at a p-value of 0.03. 
While the estimated impacts of covariates do hardly change in comparison to the single-
equation estimates discussed above, the estimated correlation 12ˆ  is negative and highly sig-
nificant. In addition to selection based on observables, unobserved factors are correlated nega-
tively across equations. For instance, adverse random shocks restricting firms’ liquidity might 
increase the necessity of loan financing and, at the same time, make firms cut back their R&D 
expenditure. If we take this effect into account, R&D intensity and the share of loan financing 
in young firms are in fact positively related.  
Our central result is related to Savignac’s (2008) finding that the existence of financing con-
straints restrains the probability of innovation activities. However, the recursive probit ap-
proach chosen by Savignac restricts the relationship of financing and innovation to be one-
directional. The same drawback holds for the probit approach of Winston Smith (2010), who 
estimates the probability of patents, instrumenting financial leverage. Baldwin et al. (2002) 
estimate regressions for both the share of long-term debt and R&D investment of Canadian 
firms, and report a negative relationship between these two variables. This finding differs 
from our key result. The likely reason is that, while employing 2 SLS estimations to instru-
ment both variables of interest, Baldwin et al. (2002) do not estimate their equations simulta-
neously and thus disregard the negative cross-equation correlation. 
5 Conclusion 
R&D activities are a decisive mean for newly founded firms to gain a competitive advantage 
over their rivals and to establish themselves in the market. However, R&D activities incur 
high costs that are difficult to bear in particular for young firms (Hall, 2002; Hall and Learner 
Learner, 2010). Expenditure on R&D often exceeds young firms’ internal financing capacity 
and induces firms to draw on external financing. The interrelation of R&D activities and fi-
nancial leverage as measured by the share of loan financing in total financing needs is at heart 
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of this paper. Our empirical analyses are based on the first two survey waves of the 
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, a unique data set on business start-ups in Germany that combines 
firm information with entrepreneur-related specifics. 
Single-equation estimates of the financing equation reveal that the share of loan financing is 
mainly determined by firm-specific variables derived from traditional theories of corporate 
finance like static trade-off theory or variants of the pecking order hypothesis (cp. Chang et al. 
2009). Entrepreneur-specific variables only play a subordinate role for explaining firms’ fi-
nancial leverage. Given the importance of the entrepreneur in newly founded firms, this result 
is surprising at first sight. However, it shows that from a demand-side perspective, founders’ 
financing preferences are strongly guided by the requirements of their start-up projects – 
which are in turn captured by the broad set of firm variables (Kohn and Ullrich, 2010). From a 
supply-side perspective, banks may take observable characteristics of the founders as an ini-
tial signal for creditworthiness, but the importance of this signal declines rapidly even in the 
first few years of firms’ existence. On the contrary, both firm-specific and entrepreneur-
specific variables are decisive for the level of a firm’s R&D intensity. 
One outstanding result of the simultaneous two-equation model is the fact that the coefficient 
estimates for the exogenous covariates hardly differ between the single-equation models and 
the bivariate model. This result underlines the robustness of our findings with respect to the 
choice of exogenous covariates. The estimated effects of the endogenous regressors do differ 
between the respective models, though. Whereas descriptive statistics even mitigate in favour 
of a negative relationship between the share of loan financing and R&D intensity, results of 
single-equation estimates do not show any significant relationship. This finding hints towards 
selection based on observables in both R&D intensity and financial leverage. What is more, 
the simultaneous equation model reveals that there is a significantly positive interrelation 
though unobserved random shocks are negatively correlated across the two equations. In re-
sponse to adverse idiosyncratic shocks, firms may cut back their R&D expenditure while sim-
ultaneously the need for external loan financing increases.  
We conclude that financial leverage and R&D activity are in fact interdependent and positive-
ly related. One drawback of present study is the cross-sectional set-up of the empirical analy-
sis. Future research aiming at the innovation-financing relationship may use longer-term panel 
data sets which would allow researchers to examine changes of young firms’ capital structure 
over time, and to analyse how these changes might be traced back to R&D activities in the 
past. 
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Appendix 
Table 6: Composition of industry sectors 
 Sector NACE Rev. 1.1 
 High-technology industries  
1 Cutting-edge technology manufacturing  23.30, 24.20, 24.41, 24.42, 29.60, 30.02, 
32.10, 32.20, 32.30, 33.10, 33.20, 33.30, 
35.30 
2 High-technology manufacturing 24.13-4, 24.16-7, 24.51, 24.61, 24.63-4, 
24.66, 25.11, 25.13, 26.15, 29.11-4, 29.24, 
29.31-2, 29.41-3, 29.52-6, 30.01, 31.10, 
31.20, 31.40, 31.50, 31.61-2, 33.40, 34.10, 
34.30, 35.20 
3 Technology-intensive services 64.3, 72 (without 72.2), 73.1, 74.2, 74.3 
4 Software supply and consultancy 72.2 
 Non-high-tech industries   
5 Non-high-tech manufacturing 15 – 37 (without sectors 1 + 2) 
6 Skill-intensive services (non-technical consulting services) 73.2, 74.11-4, 74.4 
7 Other business-oriented services 60.3, 61, 62, 63.1-2, 63.4, 64.1, 71.1-3, 
74.5-8 (without 74.87.7), 90 
8 Consumer-oriented services 55, 60.1-2, 63.3, 65-67, 70, 71.4, 80.4, 92, 
93 
9 Construction 45 
10 Wholesale and retail trade (without trade agents) 50 – 52 (without 51.1) 
Cutting-edge manufacturing technology: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure > 7.0% of total sales. 
High-technology manufacturing: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure 2.5 – 7.0% of total sales.  
Source: Legler and Frietsch (2006), own classification. 
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Table 7: Financing structure, unweighted sample results 
 Share of all firms using the source of 
finance (%) Average share in total financing (%) 
Revenues from sales/retained 
profits 91.7 73.8 
Founder’s means 46.0 16.4 
Capital from third parties 30.7 9.8 
 Share of all firms using capital from third parties (%)
Average share in total capital received 
from third parties (%)
 Bank loans 70.5 50.9 
 Promotional loans  32.9 19.5 
 Relatives and friends  19.0 10.7 
 Subsidies from Federal  
 Employment Agency 31.0 14.0 
 Equity capital 8.8 4.9 
 Loan financing a 81.8 70.4 
a Bank loans and promotional loans. 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
 
Table 8: R&D activities, unweighted sample results 
 
# of obser-
vations 
 Percentiles 
 Mean 25% 50% 75% 
Average expenditure on R&D (Euro) 1,748 31,800 3,000 12,300 40,000 
R&D intensity (%) 1,383 37.4 2.2 7.6 21.4 
Numbers referring to firms conducting own R&D activities. R&D intensity measured as expenditure on R&D over total 
sales. R&D expenditure and total sales are trimmed by excluding values above the 99th percentiles. 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
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Table 9: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Operationalisation in the questionnaire Mean Median 
Share of loan financing How high were the proportions of different sources of external capi-
tal in the year 200X? [Loan financing includes the following catego-
ries: overdraft credit, other bank loans, promotional loans from KfW 
or financial institutions of the German states.] 
6.7% 0% 
R&D intensity - How high were your expenses for research and development in-
cluding possible assignments to third parties in the previous year? 
- What was the amount of sales in the year 200X? 
4.6% 0% 
Number of employees How many employees worked in your firm by 31/12/200X? 3.4 2 
Profitability Did your firm realise a profit or a loss before taxes in the year 200X? 
How high was your firm’s profit (loss) before taxes in the year 
200X? 
3.5% 10% 
Incorporated firm [Dummy variable, identifier taken from Creditreform database.] 31.6% 0 
Investments/financing needs - What was the amount of total investments in the year 200X? 
- What was the amount of your operating costs in the year 200X? 
30.8% 23.1% 
Firm age (in years) In which year was your firm established? [Initial founding year, not 
mere change of ownership, name, or legal form.] 
2.3 2 
Team of entrepreneurs Was your firm set up by one single founder or by a team of several 
founders, owners, or shareholders? 
26.5% 0 
Employees with required uni-
versity degree (dummy varia-
ble) 
How many of your employees work in occupations requiring a uni-
versity degree? 
11.4% 0 
Entrepreneur with university 
degree 
Which is the highest professional qualification that the founder(s) 
has (have) acquired? 
[Tertiary education institutions comprise technical colleges, full 
universities, and doctoral programmes.] 
40.5% 0 
Female entrepreneurs only Is the founder male or female? 
How many of the founders are female? 
9.2% 0 
Entrepreneurs with foreign 
origin only 
Which national origin does (do) the founder(s) have? 5.3% 0 
Age of the oldest entrepreneur 
(in years) 
- In which year was the founder born? 
- Please indicate the age of each founder. 
40.7 40 
Positive entrepreneurial experi-
ence 
Had (one of) the founder(s) already founded one or more firms 
before the recent start-up? What happened to these firms? [Answers: 
old firm continues to exist, was handed over to a family member or a 
successor, or was sold.] 
20.1% 0 
Negative entrepreneurial expe-
rience 
Had (one of) the founder(s) already founded one or more firms 
before the recent start-up? What happened to these firms? [Answers: 
old firm closed due to insolvency, closed without insolvency pro-
ceedings.] 
12.2% 0 
Necessity entrepreneur What was the main reason for the (members of the) founder (team) 
to start working self-employed? [Necessity motives include the 
following answers: There was no appropriate alternative option on 
the labour market; To resort from unemployment.] 
16.7% 0 
Personal wealth/financing 
needs (non-missing values) 
- Aside from assets related to your firm, did you possess additional 
private assets at the end of the year 200X?  
- Aside from liabilities resulting from your entrepreneurial activities, 
did you have additional liabilities at the end of the year 200X? 
500.6% 30.4% 
Missing information on per-
sonal wealth 
[Dummy variable] 29.9% 0 
Descriptive statistics (unweighted) are displayed for the sample used for the bivariate regression. All absolute values used to 
calculate ratios are trimmed by excluding values below the 1st or above the 99th percentiles. 
Data source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. 
